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.HE SUPREME COURT OF 
PHE STATE OF UTAH 
3 
Case No, 9005 3 3 
of 
JOHN BEN MAXFIELD, 
D e c e a s e d , 
( P r i o r i t y No. 16) 
BRIEF OF APPELI »EE LOUISE A. MAXFIELD 
JURISDICTION 
T h i s Cou r t h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h i s c a s e unde i: U t a h 
Code Ann. § 7 8 - 2 - 2 ( 3 ) ( j ) (111 9 8 ; ) 
I S S HE S PRESENTED IF OR REV I.EW 
1. • D i d t h e t r i a 1 c o i I i: t e r r ::i n f I n d i n g t h a t L o u i s e A 
Maxfi s J d c ::: -i i t r i 1: i i t e d ::  i is 1 la ] f c f t l le si LITIS d e p o s d t e d :i i i t h B j ::: :il i i t 
a c c o u n t s , wi t h I n t h e in e a n i n g o f U 1: a 1 i C o d e A i In § 3 5 6 1 0 3 (111 ) 
( 1 9 7 8 ) ? A p p e l l a n t h a s t h e b u r d e n o f m a r s h a l i n g a l ] o f t h e 
e I dem t "iii|i| in I i mi ) I I MI I i ml i in| iniim! i I ill im in,I i <:i I i iiq I In ill i »f:n 
i t wiewed i n t h e l i g h t m o s t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e t r i a l c o u r ' *i* 
e v i d e n c e if: 1 eqa 11 y i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n q i i U o e l l e 
v b i d d l e y , HI IP , il II '( I I 'I' I l li I ili Mi i i J e n s e n v. Hi uwu I ) 
P. 2d 1 50, 1 5 2 ( U t a h 1 9 8 1 ) . 
2 . Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r MI f i n d i n g t h a t t fie b u l k 
c : he p r o p e r t y b i o u y h t j u t n I hi HIMJ r 11 au|i by J o h n Ben Md>,tj< Id • 
l o s t , i t s c h a r a c t e r a s s e p a r a t e p r o p e r t y and became m a r i t a l 
j11 n11(?! !' '' i i I'll11 1 11 1111 ,11 in 1 I 11111 i 11 h i^  i'« f i i 1 11 i A MII * • ifinji t e d 
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one-half? Appellant has the burden of marshaling all the 
evidence supporting the finding and of demonstrating that, even 
if viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court, the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings. Doelle 
v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); Jensen v. Brown. 639 
P.2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-103. Ownership during 
lifetime.--(1) A joint account belongs, during the lifetime of 
all parties, to the parties in proportion to the net 
contributions by each to the sums on deposit, unless there is 
clear and convincing evidence of a different intent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-202(2)(b). All values included 
in the augmented estate are presumed to be marital property. The 
presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the 
property to which these values is not marital property as defined 
in subsection (2)(a) of this section. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. flgityre of the C??e* 
This is an appeal from an Order of the lower court (R. 
187) and from Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 181), 
by which the court held that appellee Louise A. Maxfield owned 
one-half of the sums that had been on deposit in joint accounts 
at the time she withdrew the sums therefrom. 
i 
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B. pigppgitipp Qf the C»S? PglQW-
The action was commenced following the death of John 
Ben Maxfield by the filing of an Application for Informal Probate 
of Will and Informal Appointment of Personal Representative (R. 
1) to which appellee objected (R. 6). Thereafter, appellee filed 
a Motion to File Amended Pleading and to Bifurcate the Issues to 
be Heard at the Time of Trial (R. 36), which was granted (R. 47). 
Appellee filed an Amended Objection to Application for Informal 
Probate and Petition for Determination if there are Assets 
Comprising an Estate and Petition for Formal Probate and 
Appointment of Personal Representative. (R. 38. ) 
Trial was held on June 11, 1990, following which the 
trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law from the 
bench. (Tr. 233-38, 293-97.) The Court entered its written 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 11, 1990, (R. 
181, 186) from which appellant appealed. Although appellee filed 
a cross-appeal, she has determined not to pursue the cross-
appeal, as explained below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant John Ben Maxfield ("Ben") and Louise A. 
Maxfield ("Louise") were married in September of 1961. (Tr. 9. ) 
Each was approximately fifty years old at the time. Ben had two 
children from a prior marriage, Ben J. Maxfield and Joy Thornock. 
-3-
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Louise had three children from a prior marriage, Alice Coffman, 
Karen Wall, and Stanton LeSieur. 
At the time of the marriage, Louise owned a home 
located at 474 16th Street in Ogden, Utah and approximately 
$1, 200 in a checking account,, (Tr. 9, 235-36. ) Louise' s home 
served as the marital domicile until November of 1986 (Tr. 102) 
when Ben' s health required that he be placed in a rest home 
setting. (Tr. 89-91. ) 
At the time of his marriage to Louise in 1961, Ben 
owned a farm in Harrisville, Utah, a small tract of residential 
property in Harrisville, and stock in the Hisfield Gravel 
Company. He also had a checking account containing approximately 
$500. (Tr. 9. ) Ben also had rights to a contract worth 
approximately $8,000 from the sale of property located at 368 
Collins, (Lot 1, Block 1, El Rancho) Ogden, Utah to George H. and 
Donna G. Eastman. (Ex. lip and 23d. ) Because Ben owed 
approximately the same amount c>n the property to Ray Westly and 
Joyce Elaine Moss (Ex. 23d), however, the Eastman Contract 
i 
apparently was worthless. 
Through their 28 year marriage, the monies, affairs, 
business, and lives of Louise and Ben were extensively 
{ 
intermingled and they jointly participated in the mutual support 
and care for one another. Louise worked at C. C. Anderson (Bon 
March) until 1971. (Tr. 16, 22. ) All the money that she earned 
i 
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went into joint accounts with Ben. (Tr. 16. ) Similarly, 
appellants admit that Ben also pooled his earnings with Louise in 
the joint checking and joint savings accounts and the joint 
certificates of deposit. (Appellants' brief, at 4. ) Ben and 
Louise also participated in numerous transactions whereby they 
purchased, improved, or sold real estate. The proceeds from all 
these sales were placed in their joint accounts. (Tr. 15). In 
later years, rather than deposit her Social Security check in the 
joint accounts, Louise simply would cash it to buy groceries. 
(Tr. 71, 128. ) The couple filed joint income tax returns every 
year since 1961. (Tr. 15. ) 
The Maxfield's real estate transactions can be divided 
into three groups: 
(1) Sales of the Harrisville residential property 
that had been brought into the marriage by Ben and 
improved during the marriage by Ben and Louise. 
(2) Sales of real property conveyed to both 
Louise and Ben during the marriage from His field Gravel 
Company. 
(3) The resale of miscellaneous parcels of real 
estate that had been jointly acquired during the 
marriage. 
g:\wpl\088\00000wrp.W51 
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l. The Hflryj.gv;Ulg-property 
The Harrisville residential property owned by Ben prior 
to his marriage was converted into commingled marital property 
through subsequent transactions. A portion was sold to Grant Z. 
and Annie Stephens on January 26, 1962 (Ex. 57d) for $11,000, 
which was deposited in the Maxfield's joint account. (Tr. 15. ) 
The Maxfields then jointly mortgaged the remaining Harrisville 
residential property to purchase property in Plain City, Utah, in 
the amount of $16,900. Louise signed the mortgage on this 
property and was obligated for the repayment of the loan. (Ex. 
8p, 9p, 10p, and 16p. ) 
Louise also helped improve the Harrisville residential 
property during the marriage by painting it. (Tr. 101, 102. ) 
When the remaining Harrisville residential property was sold in 
three parcels to Eggleston, Edwards, and Nye (Ex. 9p, lOp, 57d), 
the three warranty deeds listed the grantors as J.B. Maxfield and 
Louise Maxfield, husband and wife, and were signed by both Ben 
and Louise. Again, all proceeds from these sales were placed in 
the couple's joint accounts. (Tr. 15. ) These three sales 
occurred over a 5 year period between 1964 and 1969. 
In their brief, appellants refer to sales of the 
Harrisville property to George L. and Karlene Knight (Ex. 57d) 
and to Vernon E. and Bonnie Lee Moss (Ex. 57d) from the 
Harrisville residential property brought by Ben to the marriage. 
g:\wpl\088\00000wrp.W51 
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These sales, however, both occurred prior to the marriage. No 
evidence was presented at trial to indicate what Ben did with the 
proceeds of the sales. There was no evidence that the proceeds 
were either placed into the joint accounts with Louise or brought 
into the marriage as Ben' s separate property. 
2. His field Gravel Company. 
Ben's interest in Hisfield Gravel Company was also 
converted to marital property. On March 16, 1967, Ben and Louise 
executed an agreement for the dissolution of Hisfield Gravel. 
(Ex. 15p, 53p. ) By this agreement, Ben and Louise assumed all 
obligations, debts, benefits, and rights of Hisfield Gravel 
Company under an October 20, 1961, contract between Hisfield 
Gravel Company and Security Title Company of Ogden. Hisfield 
Gravel Company in return conveyed to both Ben and Louise 67.3 
acres of land in the Rolling Hills subdivision and Lots 15, 16 
and 17 of the Rolling Hills Addition. The warranty deed from 
Hisfield Gravel Company conveyed the property to Ben and Louise 
as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship. (Ex. 54p. ) 
Louise also participated in the dissolution meetings of Hisfield 
Gravel. (Tr. 108. ) 
Louise and Ben thereafter jointly sold this property. 
They sold the three Rolling Hills Addition lots to Dale W. and 
Linda Stoker, Huffman and Fiet, and Steve C. and Glenda L. Packer 
under warranty deeds that listed both Ben and Louise as the 
-7-
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sellers. These sales occurred during the period of July 1967 to 
November of 1970. These three sales generated a total of 
$11,350, which was deposited in the couple's joint accounts. 
(Tr. 15, Ex. 56d. ) 
Louise and Ben also sold 64.87 acres of the Rolling 
Hills subdivision that they had received from Hisfield Gravel to 
Fife Equipment and Investment Company ("Fife") on June 1, 1973 
for $80, 000. The purchase agreement with Fife specifically 
identified Ben and Louise as owners of the property (Ex. 56d), 
and the warranty deed showed both Ben and Louise as grantors. 
(Ex. 56d. ) As with the money from the sales of the other 
properties, the $80,000 was deposited in Louise and Ben's joint 
accounts. (Tr. 15. ) 
Hisfield Gravel conveyed a small 40 foot by 53 foot 
parcel of property located at 2071 Lane, Ogden, Utah to Ben in 
September of 1963. (Ex. 14p.) This property was then mortgaged 
by both Ben and Louise in the amount of $5,000. Under the terms 
of the mortgage, Louise was obligated to repay the loan. (Ex. ••• 
14p. ) When the Maxfields sold the property to Richard and Ethel 
Lou Sobers, the warranty deed identified Ben and Louise as 
grantors of the property. (Ex. 14p. ) The proceeds of the sale 
were placed in Ben and Louise's joint accounts. (Tr. 15. ) 
i 
-8-
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3. Miscellaneous properties. 
In their brief, appellants improperly suggest that the 
property identified as Lot 1, Block 1, El Rancho, Ogden City, 
(sold to George H. and Donna G. Eastman) provided money that was 
deposited in the joint account. (Appellants' brief, at 11. ) To 
the contrary, the property was sold prior to the marriage1 and, 
as discussed above, in essence was sold for the amount owing on 
the property and provided no funds for Ben and Louise. (Ex. 
23d. ) 
Finally, between January 1962 and June 1975, Ben and 
Louise jointly acquired and resold several parcels of real 
estate. They purchased the property located at 453 Harrisville 
Road in 1962 from Hellwell and later resold it to Sevy, earning a 
$3,500 profit. (Ex. 7p and 20d. ) In 1964, Ben and Louise 
purchased property in Plain City, Utah, mortgaged it, and then 
resold it in four different transactions between April of 1964 
and August of 1967. (Ex. 8p, 2Id. ) These transactions brought 
at least $9,200 in profit. Finally, the Maxfields purchased 
property at 458 16th Street from Campkin in 1975 and resold it to 
Bice for a $4, 000 profit. (Tr. 99, 22d. ) The total proceeds 
from the sales of these jointly acquired parcels of real estate 
amounted to $43,700. (See Appellant's Brief at 13. ) These 
In their brief, appellants state that the sale occurred on 
March 1, 1960, which was well before Ben's marriage to Louise in 
September, 1961. (Appellants' brief, at 11. ) 
-9-
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proceeds were deposited in Louise and Ben's joint accounts. (Tr. 
15. ) 
Louise participated in these transactions and worked to 
improve the properties. (Tr. 25-26, 101. ) It is important to 
note that the proceeds from the sales of these properties 
apparently were placed in the same joint accounts as all other 
real estate transactions. (Tr. 15. ) The Maxfields also paid for 
their living expenses through the funds contained in these joint 
accounts. (Tr. 128, Ex. 25d. ) Appellants concede that these 
properties were jointly acquired. (Appellant's brief, at 12-13. ) 
Louise took an active role in managing and protecting 
the couple's property. (Tr. 107, 118-19.) During the early 
years of the marriage, both Louise and Ben managed the checkbook. 
(Tr. 107. ) In 1970, Ben began to have health problems caused by 
his drinking (Tr. 107) and in 1978, Louise took exclusive control 
of the couple's checking account because Ben was spending from 
three to five hundred dollars a month on alcohol. (Tr. 118-19.) 
Louise played an integral role in managing and protecting the 
i 
couple's joint finances during this time. 
In 1985, Ben and Louise conveyed their interest in the 
marital home to Louise and her three children. (Ex. 45d. ) 2 At 
2In their brief, appellants do not challenge the lower court' s 
finding that the home deeded to Louise and her three children was 
non-marital property. (Finding of Fact No. 4. ) 
-10-
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the same time, the farm in Harrisville owned by Ben prior to the 
marriage was deeded to Ben and his children. (Tr. 87-88.) 
During the 25 year period between 1961 and 1986 the 
Maxfields continued to live from the funds placed in their joint 
checking and savings accounts. They also placed certain of these 
funds in joint certificates of deposit. As of November 25, 1986, 
the couple's joint accounts were as follows: 
Account Number ^Qint Qyn$rg Amount 
Checking Account J. B. Maxfield or $ 14, 178. 18 
121 477 4 Louise A. Maxfield 
Savings Account J. B. Maxfield or 10,372.71 
0109-8233 Louise A. Maxfield 
CD 30247 J. B. Maxfield or 66,677.21 
Louise A. Maxfield or 
Joy Thornock 
CD 32104 Louise A. Maxfield or 72,489.02 
J. B. Maxfield or 
Stanton LeSieur 
CD 32911 Louise A. Maxfield or 9,097.11 
J. B. Maxfield or 
Joy Thornock 
CD 34244 J. B. Maxfield or 63,215.00 
Louise A. Maxfield or 
Ben J. Maxfield 
CD 34245 J. B. Maxfield or 37,804.37 
Louise A. Maxfield 
As appellants acknowledge, there is no evidence that any party 
other than J. B. Maxfield and Louise A. Maxfield ever contributed 
funds to the said accounts. (Appellant' s brief at 5. ) 
-11-
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During November of 1986, Ben's physical health 
deteriorated to the point that Louise was unable to care for him. 
Their medical doctor told Louise that Ben would need to be put in 
a rest home. (Tr. 91-93.) Louise believed Ben was suffering 
from a deterioration of the brain. (Tr. 89. ) When she informed 
Ben' s children3 that Ben was to be put into a rest home, the 
children physically removed Ben from Louise' s home and took him 
home with them. Ben' s children soon discovered that they also 
could not care for him. (Tr. 93. ) Ben stayed with Joy Thornock 
for 10 days and Ben J. Maxfield ("Benny") for two weeks. He was 
then placed into a rest home. (Tr. 93. ) 
During this time period, Benny asked Louise about the 
status of the couple's finances. (Tr. 156.) Benny had borrowed 
$11,000.00 from the couple in August of 1986. (Tr. 166. ) Louise 
described her relationship with Ben's children as "very distant" 
during this period. (Tr. 114. ) Louise believed that after Ben's 
children removed Ben from the home, they would take all the 
marital funds on deposit in the joint accounts, depriving her of 
any means of support. (Tr. 115, 131. ) 
Louise consulted her attorney who advised her to remove 
the money in the joint accounts to prevent Ben's children from 
taking the money. (Tr. 54. ) Louise then removed the funds and 
3These were Ben' s children from his previous marriage, Ben J. 
Maxfield and Joy Thornock, who are the appellants in the present 
case. i 
g:\wpl\088\00000wrp.W51 
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placed a total of $150,000.00 in five P. O. D. accounts, each in 
the amount of $30, 000. 00. The five P. 0. D. designees were Ben' s 
children and Louise' s children. Louise placed the remaining 
funds in a joint account with her three children to take care of 
Ben and her for the rest of their lives. (Tr. 53. ) She in fact 
used the money from this joint account to provide for herself and 
to pay for Ben's rest home care. (Tr. 131. ) 
On February 13, 1987, Louise executed a trust agreement 
to take care of both herself and Ben. She transferred the funds 
that she had withdrawn in November of 1986 to the trust. 
Thereafter, Ben joined his children in a suit for conversion 
against Louise based on her withdrawal of the funds in the joint 
accounts. (Tr. 267-70.) Ben also filed for divorce (Tr. 269) 
and prepared a trust under which Louise would receive only 
$600.00 a month. (R. 5; Ex. 43d.) On May 18, 1987, the Maxfields 
entered into a stipulation whereby the conversion suit was 
dismissed, a special conservatorship account was established at 
the Bank of Utah to care for Ben and Louise to the exclusion of 
their children, and the determination of property distribution 
issues was relegated to the divorce action. (Ex. 2p. ) 
At the trial of the divorce action, the court in that 
case found Ben incompetent and refused to grant the divorce. 
(Ex. 3p. ) The court in the divorce case also modified the 
stipulation and order to allow the special conservator 
-13-
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arrangement to continue until further order by the court but 
specifically declared that the holding of the funds by the 
special conservator was not a final determination of the 
ownership of said funds. (Ex. 3p/) Ben Maxfield passed away on 
December 3, 1989. (R. 1. ) Appellants filed this probate action 
the following day. (R. 4. ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellants have wholly failed to meet their burden 
in attacking the trial court' s finding of fact that the bulk of 
the property Ben brought into the marriage lost its separate 
character and became marital property. Substantial evidence 
presented at trial indicated that Louise augmented, maintained 
and protected the property both before and after the property was 
sold and the proceeds were placed in joint accounts. The 
evidence further showed that Ben inextricably commingled the 
s 
property with both Louise' s property and other marital property 
during most of their 28 year marriage. Finally, the evidence 
indicated that Ben intended to contribute the bulk of his 
property to the marital estate. 
Case law dealing with the definition of marital 
property in divorce actions should apply to this case in 
i 
interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-103(1) (1978). The facts of 
this case are closely analagous to those requiring an equitable 
division of property in divorce cases. In addition, public 
-14-
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policy considerations favor a construction of Section 75-6-103(1) 
based on the equitable rules provided in domestic law. 
The definition of marital property contained in the 
elective share provisions of Utah' s Uniform Probate Code, Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-2-202(a) and (b), is not applicable to the instant 
action. Louise has not elected to pursue her statutory elective 
share and, therefore, the narrow definition of marital property 
for that limited purpose has little relevance to the present 
case. However, even assuming, arguendo, that the elective share 
definition applies, appellants failed to overcome the presumption 
of marital property contained in the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 
75-2-202(2)(b). Accordingly, the trial court's finding of fact 
and decision below should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
LOUISE MAXFIELD OWNED ONE-HALF OF THE 
SUMS HELD IN THE JOINT ACCOUNTS. 
A. Scope of Review. 
In Finding of Fact No. 2, the trial court found that 
"the bulk of the property brought into the marriage by John Ben 
Maxfield lost its character as separate property and became 
marital property to which each contributed one-half (1/2)." (R. 
182. ) Appellants seek to overturn this finding. 
g:\wpl\088\Q0000wrp.W51 
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This Court recently reiterated the standard of review 
applicable to an appeal of the trial court' s findings of fact in 
Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P. 2d 1176 (Utah 1989), There, the court 
stated: 
To successfully attack findings of fact, an 
appellant must first marshal all the evidence 
supporting the findings and then demonstrate 
that, even if viewed in the light most 
favorable to the trial court, the evidence is 
legally insufficient to support the findings. 
And the legal sufficiency of the evidence is 
determined under civil procedure rule 52(a), 
which provides: "Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, 
and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. " A trial 
court's factual finding is deemed "clearly 
erroneous" only if it is against the clear 
weight of the evidence. 
Id. at 1178 (citations omitted). See Jensen v. Brown, 639 P. 2d 
150, 152 (Utah 1981) (the same standard applies to equity cases). 
In the instant case, appellants have not complied with 
this rule. In their brief, they made no attempt to marshal the 
evidence in support of the trial court' s finding nor do they 
demonstrate that the evidence supporting the finding is 
insufficient even if viewed in the light most favorable to the 
trial court. Appellant' s brief presents the evidence in a light 
most favorable to their own position and largely ignores the 
contrary evidence. Accordingly, Judge Roth' s findings should not 
be disturbed. 
-16-
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B. Appellants have not jnet their fryrflen in 
ghgwjng that the SVms gn fleppgit j-Ti the JglPt 
accounts were not contributed equally bv the 
parties-
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-103(1) (1978) provides: 
A joint account belongs, during the lifetime 
of all parties, to the parties in proportion 
to the net contributions by each to the sums 
on deposit, unless there is clear and 
convincing evidence of a different intent. 
Appellants assert that the transfer of funds from the 
joint accounts by Louise in November of 1986 terminated any joint 
tenancy in those funds. This assertion implicitly admits that 
the relative interests of Ben and Louise in the sums then on 
deposit in the joint accounts were segregated in November of 1986 
according to their "contributions" to the accounts. The 
determination of who owned what portion of the sums withdrawn 
from the joint accounts must be made as of the date on which 
Louise withdrew the funds. 
Under Section 75-6-103(1), Louise was entitled to 
ownership of the amounts that she was responsible for 
contributing to the joint accounts. Appellants take the 
simplistic view that because Ben brought some property with him 
into the marriage from which cash proceeds were generated, his 
estate is entitled to all of the money in the accounts except for 
the $9,500 earned by Louise during her marriage to Ben and half 
of the profits on the jointly-acquired property. This view is 
contrary to Utah law regarding the scope of marital property. As 
-17-
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the Utah Court of Appeals recently noted, "Marital property is 
ordinarily all property acquired during marriage, and it 
' encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the 
parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived. ' " 
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting 
gfrrflper yT ggirflner, 748 P. 2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988). 
Appellants would have this Court ignore the significant 
efforts made by Louise during her 28 year marriage to conserve 
the assets she and her husband had accumulated. They would have 
this Court overlook the substantial role that Louise played in 
her marriage partnership with her husband. The Court in Dunn 
also specifically indicated that the view now taken by appellants 
is incorrect. The Court stated: 
The lower court's approach to marital 
property distribution is troublesome as it 
suggests a weighing only of each partner' s 
financial contribution to the marriage. Such 
an analysis ignores contributions of love, 
encouragement, and companionship, which elude 
monetary valuation. Such an analysis also 
gives short shrift to spouses who contribute 
homemaking skills and child care. 
Id. at 1322. In the instant case, Ben and Louise conducted their 
lives as a partnership in every sense. They jointly participated 
in all matters affecting their assets on deposit. They pooled 
their efforts and their resources together over a period of 
nearly 28 years. It was from the joint accounts that they drew 
the money on which they lived during that long period of time. 
-18-
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Therefore, according to the rationale of Dunn, all of the 
proceeds in the joint accounts had become marital property. 
Having considered all of the evidence, the lower court 
found itself unable to determine who had contributed what 
specific amounts to the joint accounts. At the conclusion of the 
trial, the lower court made the following oral findings from the 
bench: 
During some 27 years of marriage prior to the 
separation, these parties bought and sold 
property, and they made investments. It is 
my opinion based on the evidence that the 
bulk of the property that J. B. Maxfield had 
lost its character as separate property and 
became marital property through these 
transactions. 
This is not a simple case of a person 
owning property prior to a marriage, keeping 
that in his own name, and exchanging that for 
something else. This is a case where there 
were numerous transactions. Property was 
placed in joint tenancy. It was turned over 
several times. And I find that the bulk of 
the property lost its character as separate 
property. 
Therefore, as it applies to the 
accounts, I find that each contributed one 
half. Finding anything different would have 
to be simple speculation on my part as to 
what percentage each contributed at that 
point. 
(Tr. 236. ) 
The trial court' s finding must be upheld unless 
appellants can show that it is against the clear weight of 
evidence. As noted above, appellants have not marshaled all of 
-19-
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the evidence in support of the court's finding. They did not 
summarize the "numerous transactions" referred to by the court. 
They made no effort to describe all of the evidence of the 
couple' s investments, of the various sales transactions in which 
they were involved. Without having that evidence summarized 
before it, this Court cannot overturn the lower court' s finding 
of fact that Louise and Ben each contributed one-half of the sums 
into the joint accounts. 
The finding of the lower court that the property Ben 
brought with him into the marriage "lost its character as 
separate property and became marital property to which each 
contributed one-half" (Finding of Fact No. 2) is consistent with 
the manner in which Utah courts divide property owned by a 
husband and wife in divorce cases. Divorce cases provide the 
best analogy to the facts of the present case since both Ben and 
i 
Louise were living in November of 1986, when Louise withdrew the 
money from the joint accounts. The Utah cases dealing with the 
division of marital property in divorce cases provide helpful 
guidance in determining how to apportion ownership of a joint 
account under Section 75-6-103(1) as between a husband and wife. 
In contesting the trial court's finding of fact, 
appellants assert that the property brought by Ben into the 
marriage did not lose its character as separate property by being 
placed into joint tenancy through various sales and purchases. 
i 
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(Appellants' brief, at 21.) Although "premarital property, 
gifts, and inheritances may be viewed as separate property, and 
in appropriate circumstances, equity will require that each party 
retain the separate property brought to the marriage," Burke v. 
Burke, 753 P. 2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987), there are exceptions, as 
the Court of Appeals noted in Burt v. Burt. 799 P. 2d 1166 (Utah 
App. 1990): 
[S]uch property may appropriately be 
considered part of the marital estate, 
subject to division, when the other spouse 
has by his or her efforts augmented, 
maintained, or protected the inherited or 
donated property . . . where the parties have 
inextricably commingled the property with 
marital property so that it has lost its 
separate character, . . . or where the 
recipient spouse has contributed all or part 
of the property to the marital estate. 
I£. at 1169 (citations omitted). See Mortenson v. Mortenson, 760 
P. 2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). 
In the present case each of these exceptions is 
satisfied. First, Louise augmented, maintained or protected 
virtually all of the separate property brought into the marriage 
by Ben as well as the funds in the joint accounts. She painted 
and improved the Harrisville residential properties. (Tr. 101-
102. ) She attended and participated in the dissolution meetings 
of His field Gravel Company and entered into an agreement 
accepting certain obligations and responsibilities concerning the 
dissolution. (Tr. 108, Ex. 15p. ) She signed the mortgage 
g:\wpl\088\00000wrp.W51 
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document on the small parcel of property deeded solely to Ben by 
His field Gravel Company as well as the mortgage document on the 
Harrisville residential properties. (Ex. 8p, 9p, lOp, 16p, 14p.) 
Appellants completely ignore the significance of 
Louise's signing mortgages in connection with these properties. 
The fact that she placed her good name and credit at risk along 
with her husband is strong evidence that Louise and Ben were 
acting together for their mutual interests and that the proceeds 
from the sales of the properties had, in their minds, lost their 
character as separate property. 
She helped manage the couple' s books from the outset of 
the marriage and took sole control of the joint checking account 
in 1978 to protect their assets during the time that Ben was 
suffering from a drinking problem. (Tr. 107, 118-19. ) She added 
her own earnings to the joint accounts from 1961 to 1971, the 
time period when most of the real estate transactions transpired. 
(Tr. 16. ) She participated in the purchases and sales of the 
jointly acquired properties and the proceeds from those 
transactions were placed into the joint accounts. (Tr. 15, 26, 
101. ) She signed warranty deeds to the purchasers of the 
property. (Ex. 7p, 8p, 9p, lOp, 12p, 14p, 15p, 16p, 19d, 20d, 
( 
21d, 22d, 56d, 57d). 
The weight of the evidence supports the lower court's 
finding that the bulk of the property brought into the marriage 
-22-
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by Ben lost its character as separate property and became marital 
property. There is ample evidence that Louise helped to augment, 
maintain, or protect both the joint accounts and the real 
property parcels prior to their sale. 
Second, the property Ben brought to the marriage was 
thereafter inextricably commingled with the marital property and 
lost its separate character. As noted above, Louise' s paychecks, 
Ben's paychecks, the proceeds from the sales of the jointly 
acquired property, the proceeds from the His field Gravel 
property, and the proceeds from the Harrisville residential 
properties were all placed in the same joint accounts. The 
couple's living expenses were also paid out of these accounts. 
The real estate was acquired and sold in numerous transactions 
over a long time period. Indeed, not only were these properties 
inextricably commingled, they were inextricably commingled during 
most of their 28 year marriage. 
It should be emphasized that the Hisfield Gravel 
property was deeded to both Ben and Louise. (Ex. 54p. ) This 
court has held that a party attacking the validity of a written 
instrument such as a deed must do so by clear and convincing 
evidence. Baker v. Pattee, 684 P. 2d 632, 634, (Utah 1984); 
Barlow Soc. v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 723 P. 2d 398, 400 (Utah 
1986). No evidence whatsoever was presented at trial that 
indicated Hisfield Gravel did not intend to convey the real 
g:\wpl\088\00000wrp.W51 
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estate to both Ben and Louise, and appellants did not argue the 
issue. The proceeds from the sales of that property clearly 
constituted marital property when such funds were placed into the 
joint accounts. 
Finally, Ben appears to have contributed the property 
at issue to the marital estate. The farm property, however, was 
treated differently, having been deeded specifically to Ben and 
his children. The couple treated Louise' s home in the same 
fashion, which was deeded to her and her three children from her 
prior marriage. The trial court was impressed with this 
evidence: 
I find it significant that the farm was 
treated separately, and that Louise 
Maxfield's home was treated separately. That 
leads me to believe that it was the intention 
of the parties that that property remain 
separate and that the other property be joint 
comingled [sic] marital property. 
(Tr. 236-37. ) 
Appellants have pointed to no contrary evidence of the 
parties' intent. Their whole case consists of a mere recitation 
of evidence that Ben owned some property prior to his marriage 
which he sold after his marriage. Appellants again overlook the 
fact that the proceeds from the sales of all of the properties 
were placed into joint accounts where they were available for use 
by the Maxfields. They ignore the fact that those proceeds were 
thereafter used for the mutual support of both Ben and Louise. 
-24-
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They presented no evidence at trial that prior to November of 
1986 Ben ever intended that any of the funds should not become 
part of the marital estate or that they not be owned mutually by 
he and his wife. 
In light of the many years that the funds were kept in 
joint tenancy, used for the joint support of Ben and Louise, and 
commingled with marital funds, an obvious inference is raised 
that Ben contributed the property to the marital estate. There 
was ample evidence to support the court' s finding that the bulk 
of Ben' s property lost its character as separate property and 
became marital property. As the trial court found, the separate 
treatment of Ben' s farm and Louise' s home is significant. 
Everything else was intended to be owned in common, without 
treating it as separate property. 
In short, because the amounts in the joint accounts 
became marital property and part of the marital estate, equitable 
considerations dictate that they were "contributed" equally by 
Ben and Louise within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-6-103(1). The substantial weight of the evidence presented 
at trial supported the trial court' s conclusion that the property 
brought by Ben to the marriage lost its separate character and 
was subject to an equitable division by the court according to 
the criteria expressed in Burt. 
-25-
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This case could have a substantial impact on divorce 
cases, where money on deposit in joint accounts frequently must 
be divided. Courts generally divide such funds based on 
principles of equity and fairness -to the parties. If this Court 
holds, as appellants would have it hold, that Section 75-6-103(1) 
requires an exacting calculation as to who deposited what 
specific amounts in joint accounts without regard to the factors 
discussed in Burt and other cases, it will tie the hands of 
divorce courts and will leave many spouses without an equitable 
share of such funds. 
Many domestic cases involve long-term marriages where 
money was pooled and used for the common support of a husband and 
wife over many years. Not unusually in those cases, one spouse 
generates the income while the other spouse lends support at 
home. Courts have not hesitated in such cases to award the 
spouse providing support at home a fair share of marital 
property, without regard to the specific source of the income. 
See Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314, 1322 (Utah App. 1990). If 
appellants prevail in this case, courts sitting in divorce cases { 
throughout the State of Utah will be constrained to apply Section 
75-6-103(1) in a way that may treat some spouses unfairly. 
Other public policy considerations also favor the ( 
application of divorce law to the instant action. No valid 
reason exists to define marital property differently where a 
• i 
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marriage ends as a result of death rather than divorce (unless, 
unlike the present case, the elective share is at issue). Ben's 
children should not be entitled to a larger share of the marital 
estate merely because Ben became incapacitated prior to the 
divorce hearing and died. His children' s interest in the marital 
property certainly is no greater than Ben' s interest would have 
been if the divorce had been completed. A spouse' s interest in 
marital property should not depend on the avenue the other spouse 
takes in leaving the marriage. 
The reasonable approach is the one taken by Judge Roth 
in the present case. He considered more than the fact that Ben 
may have owned certain property before his marriage. His finding 
that that property lost its character as separate property was 
founded on substantial evidence and is consistent with how 
divorce courts throughout the State apply equitable principles in 
dividing assets. The lower court' s Order should be affirmed. 
C. The Elective Share Statute Does Not Apply. 
Appellants assert that the definition of marital 
property for the purpose of computing the elective share in Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-2-202(2)(a) applies to this action. Their 
reliance on that section is mistaken. That statute expressly 
applies only for the limited purpose of determining the augmented 
estate to calculate the elective share. Louise simply has not 
made any claim against Ben' s estate based on her elective share. 
-27-
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\ 
Appellants erroneously imply that Louise's objection to 
the informal probate of Ben' s will contained an election to, claim 
her elective share. (Appellants' brief at 23). The objection 
merely requested that a "determination be made of marital', 
property and/or other properties which would be subject to'the 
statutory spouse allowances and marital shares." (R. 41). 
Louise made this request to enable her to determine the extent of 
Ben' s estate and allow her to make a knowledgeable choice 
regarding her options. The request cannot be construed as an 
election to take her elective share. Therefore, the elective 
share provisions, including the definition of marital property, 
are not relevant to the issues before the court. 
Moreover, the determination of marital property under 
the Uniform Probate Code applies where a person has died. 
Although Ben Maxfield has admittedly died, the issue in the 
present case focuses not on his assets at the time of his death, 
but on how much of the money in the joint accounts he owned in 
November, 1986, when Louise withdrew the money from those . 
accounts. Both Ben and Louise were living at the time. The more 
reasonable approach favors the principles used in domestic cases, 
which guide Utah Courts when they are called upon to divide , 
property and assets, including money on deposit in joint 
accounts, owned by living spouses. 
g:\wpl\088\00000wrp.W51 
-28-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Finally, the elective share statute provides that all 
values included in the augmented estate are presumed to be 
marital property. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-202(2)(b). The 
appellants failed to overcome this presumption in the proceedings 
below because, as the trial court found, Louise and Ben 
extensively commingled their assets throughout most of thier 28 
year marriage. There was substantial evidence to support this 
finding of fact. Therefore, even assuming, arguendo, that the 
definition of marital property for purposes of computing the 
elective share as contained in Section 75-2-202(2)(a) were to 
apply to this case, the statutory presumption of marital property 
contained in Section 75-2-202(2)(b) fully supports Judge Roth's 
ruling. 
II. 
APPELLANTS DO NOT CONTEST THE COURT'S RULING 
AWARDING CERTAIN PROPERTY TO LOUISE MAXFIELD. 
In addition to the money withdrawn from the joint 
accounts, the lower court awarded certain other property to 
Louise. Specifically, the court held that Louise was entitled to 
half of the acreage added to the farm property after the marriage 
and to her residence acquired prior to the marriage. (R. 185. ) 
Appellants have not attacked this portion of the Court' s order, 
which should be affirmed. 
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III. 
APPELLEE HAS MOVED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF HER 
CROSS-APPEAL. 
Louise A. Maxfield has moved this Court for an order 
dismissing her cross-appeal, pursuant to Rule 37(b), Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, she will not brief the 
issues set forth in her docketing statement and does not intend 
to pursue her cross-appeal. 4 
CONCLUSION 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-103(1), the trial court was 
required to make a determination who had contributed what amount 
as between Louise and Ben Maxfield. Judge Roth found that each 
had contributed one-half, even though Ben had brought some 
property into the marriage. The lower court' s finding that the 
bulk of Ben' s property had lost its character as separate 
property was well-supported by the evidence. Appellants failed 
to marshal the evidence in support of the finding and to show 
4Louise A. Maxfield' s present counsel did not participate in 
the trial of this case and were thus not completely familiar with 
the facts and issues involved at the time of the filing of the 
Notice of Cross-appeal. Having since become fully advised 
regarding the facts and the legal questions involved, counsel have 
been able to consult with Louise A. Maxfield regarding the matter. 
She has accordingly determined not to pursue her cross-appeal and 
has moved for its dismissal. 
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that it was against the clear weight of the evidence. Having 
failed in that burden, the lower court' s order must be affirmed. 
DATED this -3> day of May, 1991. 
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